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Approaching the Distinction between
Intuition and Insight
Zhonglu Zhang, Yi Lei * and Hong Li
Research Centre for Brain Function and Psychological Science, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen, China
Intuition and insight share similar cognitive and neural basis. Though, there are still
some essential differences between the two. Here in this short review, we discriminated
between intuition, and insight in two aspects. First, intuition, and insight are toward
different aspects of information processing. Whereas intuition involves judgment about
“yes or no,” insight is related to “what” is the solution. Second, tacit knowledge play
different roles in between intuition and insight. On the one hand, tacit knowledge is
conducive to intuitive judgment. On the other hand, tacit knowledge may first impede but
later facilitate insight occurrence. Furthermore, we share theoretical, and methodological
views on how to access the distinction between intuition and insight.
Keywords: intuition, insight, judgment, solution, RAT, tacit knowledge
BACKGROUND
Intuition can be conceived of as a sudden apprehension of coherence (pattern, meaning, structure)
above chance level with little conscious retrieval (Bowers et al., 1990; Bolte et al., 2003; Bolte
and Goschke, 2005; Volz and Von Cramon, 2006; Ilg et al., 2007; Topolinski and Strack, 2008;
Topolinski, 2011). By contrast, insight is defined as a sudden access to solution by restructuring, or
changing problem representation (Ohlsson, 1984; Knoblich et al., 1999; Öllinger and Knoblich,
2009; Öllinger et al., 2013; Kounios and Beeman, 2014). The nature of intuition or insight has
been empirically investigated and theoretically discussed in literature, separately. However, quite
few theoretical discussions address the relationships between the two. In fact, they share many
commons and are intimately linked with each other. For example, both occur under somewhat
similar situations where the final results are not clear. That is, an intuitive judgment would be made
under an uncertain circumstance perhaps due to time pressure or lack of sources (Kahneman, 2003)
or for insight an impasse would be encountered beforehand where individuals do not know what to
do next though they havemade great efforts (Ohlsson, 1984; Knoblich et al., 1999). In addition, both
intuition, and insight rely on the unconscious spreading activation of semantic associates (Ohlsson,
1984; Bowers et al., 1990; Bowden and Beeman, 1998; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Bolte and Goschke,
2005; Ilg et al., 2007; Cai et al., 2009; Sio et al., 2013) and the activation of the right superior temporal
cortex (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Ilg et al., 2007). In line with this, they share a common counterpart
for comparison, namely the analytic process which operates in a deliberately controlled style under
the framework of the dual-process theory (Epstein, 1994; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich andWest, 2000;
Kahneman, 2003). Moreover, fluency, as the relative speed and efficiency of information processing
(Reber et al., 2004), plays a causal role in both phenomena. Processing fluency of the encoded
material (without actually retrieving the solution) is the driving force of the gut feeling of intuition
not only in the coherence judgment (e.g., Topolinski and Strack, 2009; Topolinski, 2011) but also
in the intuitive judgment for solvability of problems (e.g., Topolinski et al., 2016) and in insight the
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fluency of solution retrieval is a rather epiphenomenal factor that
does not cause the insight itself, but that elicits its distinctive
experiential feature (“Aha” feeling) (Topolinski and Reber, 2010).
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INTUITION AND
INSIGHT
Though intuition and insight share overlapping cognitive and
neural features, as summarized above, they are actually not
the same coin, and can be essentially differentiated from each
other to large extent. Some works have addressed the differences
between them. For example, insight comes after intuition, and
appears into consciousness (Volz and Von Cramon, 2006). In
addition, intuition is continuous whereas insight is discontinuous
(e.g., Bowers et al., 1990). Furthermore, as Reber et al. (2007)
showed, there are significant increase in both subjective closeness
and objective closeness in intuitive judgment whereas subjective
closeness is not significantly increased, lagging far behind
objective closeness in insight problem solving. Obviously, the
behavioral, and phenomenological differences have been well
documented. Moreover, we propose that intuition and insight
are different from each other not only in the behavioral and
phenomenological levels but also in the cognitive levels in
essence. We will discuss them as follows in two aspects.
First, intuition and insight are toward two distinctive aspects
of information processing. Though the unconsciously activated
information plays a common and fundamental role in both
intuition (e.g., Bolte and Goschke, 2005; Ilg et al., 2007) and
insight (e.g., Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Sio et al., 2013), it
is guided by different cognitive operations. For intuition, this
unconsciously activated information is guided by an intuitive
judgment task on whether there is a coherence or a fourth
associative word for the triads. More specifically, intuition
mainly involves the processing of judgment on “yes/no, ” namely
intuitive judgment, which is intimately related to the behavior
of decision making (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Dane and
Pratt, 2007, 2009). In this regard, intuition cares little about “what
the ultimate result is” but the individuals’ subjective decision
upon whether there is a solution or not. For insight, however,
this unconsciously activated information is guided by conscious
retrieval which requires accessing the insightful solutions (the
fourth associative word for the triads). In other words, insight
is something about “what” is the solution rather than judgment.
Evidences from the functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) studies support the views above to some extent. With
the Remote Associate Test (RAT; Mednick and Mednick, 1967),
Ilg et al. (2007) and Jung-Beeman et al. (2004) investigated
the neural basis of intuition and insight, respectively. Both
found activities in the right superior temporal cortex, which was
regarded to be reflecting the common role of the unconsciously
activated information (Ilg et al., 2007). Moreover, they found
extra neural activity that can distinguish different cognitive
operations (intuitive judgment vs. retrieving insightful solutions)
on the unconsciously activated information. Specifically, the task
of intuitive judgment activates brain areas such as the bilateral
inferior parietal cortex that are generally related to the process
of decision making under uncertainty (Paulus et al., 2001; Ilg
et al., 2007). On the other hand, the task of retrieving insightful
solutions elicited a gamma-band activity, which indexes the
accessibility into conscious representations (Engel and Singer,
2001; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004).
Second, the role of tacit knowledge in intuition and
insight should be different. Intuition mainly benefits from tacit
knowledge. Activation of tacit knowledge starts to spread from
the three concepts (e.g., in the RAT) and finally converges on
the common remote associate. As activation accumulates, it can
facilitate the intuitive judgment though not trigger conscious
retrieval (Ilg et al., 2007). Meanwhile, this accumulated activation
brings individuals the feeling of subjective closeness to the
solution (Reber et al., 2007). The whole processing stream
starting from the primary activation of tacit knowledge to final
intuitive judgment goes continuously instead of discontinuously
without any barrier (Bowers et al., 1990). All these indicate that
tacit knowledge benefits the processing of intuitive judgment
of coherence, resulting in a continuous pattern. In contrast,
tacit knowledge may play double roles (first harmful and then
helpful) in insight occurrence. In this sense, tacit knowledge can
be divided into valid and invalid categories. In insight problem
solving, solvers primarily encounter impasse, which is mainly
caused by the strong activations of unhelpful tacit knowledge
(Ohlsson, 1984; Knoblich et al., 1999, 2001). The impasse can be
overcome when weak but valid tacit knowledge can be activated
and accessed (Knoblich et al., 2001; Bowden and Jung-Beeman,
2007) and this mainly relies on the activities at the right anterior
superior temporal gyrus (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Bowden and
Jung-Beeman, 2007).
APPROACHING THE DISTINCTION
BETWEEN INTUITION AND INSIGHT:
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL
PROPOSALS
As aforementioned, intuition and insight are two mutually
related but different cognitive constructs. However, the
differences (as well as the commonalities) that summarized
above are just based on the theoretical and empirical data in the
respective field of intuition and insight. To better understand the
nature of intuition and insight, two concerns should be taken
into consideration. First, to what extent intuition and insight are
related and distinguished with each other? Second, there is lack
of research that can systematically and directly examine their
mechanisms in the same experiment thus far. In this vein, we
share our viewpoints below.
Theoretically, future researches can consider how the
unconsciously activated information interacts with intuitive
judgment and the conscious retrieval of insightful solutions,
respectively. Though there have been some neuroimaging
evidences, as we summarized that can partly support the view that
the unconsciously activated information is guided by different
cognitive operations (namely “yes/no” judgment for intuition
and conscious retrieval of solutions for insight, respectively),
relevant studies in both fields are relatively few and need to
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 August 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1195
Zhang et al. Intuition and Insight
FIGURE 1 | The experimental procedure for both intuitive judgments and insightful solutions. In the question phase, the word triads are presented; In the
judgment phase, participants are asked to judge whether the word triads are coherent or not; In the solution phase, participant are asked to retrieve the solutions.
Intuition can be measured at the moment of coherent judgment with the solution not retrieved. Insight can be measured when the right solutions are retrieved and
reported to be insightful.
be further replicated, and expanded. In addition, as we have
distinguished, tacit knowledge may play different role in between
intuition, and insight. Some tacit knowledge may be helpful for
intuitive judgment but harmful for insight occurrence (and vice
versa). We suggest that more empirical studies can be conducted
to examine how tacit knowledge influence intuition and insight.
In methodology, we propose that future researches can
directly examine, and compare the cognitive and neural
mechanisms between intuition and insight in the same
experiment and this is possible for two reasons. First, the
commonly used materials—the RAT—have been widely used in
the studies of both intuition (e.g., Bowers et al., 1990; Bolte et al.,
2003; Bolte and Goschke, 2005; Ilg et al., 2007; Topolinski and
Strack, 2008, 2009; Topolinski, 2011) and insight (e.g., Bowden
and Beeman, 1998; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Cai et al., 2009;
Sio et al., 2013). The RAT consist of a certain number of items
and in each item there are three words of a triad as well as
their common associate (the solution word; Mednick, 1962;
Mednick and Mednick, 1967). For example, the triad “night,
wrist, stop” are in association with the solution word “watch.”
In insight problem solving, the task for the participants is to
retrieve the solution word according to the three words. Only
those solutions accompanied by “aha” feelings are regarded as
insightful ones (e.g., Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003, 2007;
Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). In intuitive judgment task, there are
not only the coherent triads (e.g., “night, wrist, stop”) with their
common associates but also the incoherent triads (e.g., “house,
lion, butter”) without any common associate. Participants do not
need to retrieve the solution word but judge whether the triads
are coherent or not (e.g., Bolte and Goschke, 2005; Ilg et al.,
2007). Second, intuition and insight stay at different phases in
the stream of information processing. Intuition occurs at the
moment of coherence judgment with the potential solutions not
retrieved (Ilg et al., 2007). Insight, however, comes at a later
stage (Volz and Von Cramon, 2006), occurring at the moment
of solution retrieval (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004) which cannot be
predicted by the intuitive judgment of FOK (feeling of knowing)
(Metcalfe and Wiebe, 1987). Considering these two points,
we suggest that they can be measured subsequently in one
experimental paradigm with the RAT as the materials. A general
paradigm is developed as follows (it should be noted that this
is one but not the only way to explore the differences between
intuition and insight).
As described in Figure 1, the RAT (the coherent triads with
solutions) as well as the incoherent triads (without solutions) can
be congregated together and then be randomly presented to the
participants one by one. Considering that the intuitive judgment
and the solutions retrieval stay at different phases in the stream
of information processing in problem solving, participants can be
instructed to complete the two tasks subsequently. Specifically,
participants can receive the coherence judgment task first, in
which they are asked to judge whether the word triads have a
common associate. In light of previous researches (e.g., Bolte
et al., 2003; Bolte and Goschke, 2005; Ilg et al., 2007), intuition
can be measured when the coherence judgments were made
with the solutions not retrieved. After the coherence judgment
task, participants can be told to retrieve the solutions to the
problems. According to previous literature (Jung-Beeman et al.,
2004; Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2007), insight can be measured
at the moment of correct solutions retrieved which are reported
insightful.
Furthermore, researchers can investigate and compare the
cognitive and neural basis of intuition and insight based on
the above-introduced paradigm by utilizing the brain imaging
techniques such as fMRI, electroencephalograph (EEG), and
so on. For example, with high spatial resolution, fMRI can
be used to localize “where” the neural signals related to the
cognitive events are in the level of millimeter in space. fMRI
has been used in the fields of both intuition and insight and
the relevant studies have found some brain region such as the
right superior temporal cortex activated in intuition and insight
(Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Ilg et al., 2007). This provides potential
regions of interest (ROI), based on which future researches can
build their respective hypothesis and further examine the neural
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basis of intuition and insight. Similarly, with millisecond-level
temporal resolution, EEG would be useful in elucidating the
neural correlates of intuition, or insight by providing neural
marks such as the event-related potentials (e.g., N100, N200,
P300) in time domain or the neural oscillations (e.g., alpha,
beta, gamma) in frequency domain.With RAT test, Jung-Beeman
et al. (2004) found a gamma-band oscillation associated with
conscious retrieval in insight problem solving. In addition, they
observed an alpha burst preceding the gamma burst. This insight-
specific alpha effect may reflect unconscious solution-related
processing (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). By contrast, there are few
EEG studies of intuition. Thus, one straightforward hypothesis
would be, for example, could alpha-band oscillation, or gamma-
band oscillation be observed during the moment of intuition? In
short, the brain imaging techniques would help to prosper the
fields of both intuition and insight.
CONCLUSIONS
As we summarized, intuition, and insight can be essentially
differentiated from each other when considering whether the
unconsciously activated information is guided by intuitive
judgment or conscious retrieval and the different roles of
tacit knowledge. Nevertheless, the differences may not be just
limited to these two aspects, which in fact need more empirical
examinations and evidences. We propose that by means of
the brain imaging techniques, future researches can consider
directly examining the cognitive and neural mechanisms
of both intuition and insight based on the RAT in one
experiment.
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